Russia’s strategic interest in capturing Odesa, Ukraine’s key Black Sea port, has been a recurring theme in its military ambitions, particularly since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Posts on X and recent analyses, including statements from Ukrainian President Zelensky and NATO officials, suggest that Odesa remains a primary target for Vladimir Putin, seen as a stepping stone to broader regional dominance. Odesa’s capture would cripple Ukraine’s maritime trade, especially grain exports, and give Russia control over a vital economic and military hub. Some speculate this aligns with a grander vision of reasserting Russian influence over historical territories, potentially extending toward Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul), a long-standing Russian imperial goal. However, no concrete evidence links Odesa’s capture directly to a current plan for Constantinople, and Russia’s military struggles, including stalled offensives and heavy losses, cast doubt on its capacity to pursue such an ambitious campaign. The idea of Odesa as a stepping stone to Constantinople seems more rhetorical than practical, rooted in historical nostalgia rather than feasible strategy.

Historically, Russia’s fixation on Constantinople dates back centuries, tied to its self-image as the “Third Rome” and protector of Orthodox Christianity. From Ivan III’s 1472 marriage to Sophia Paleologue, niece of the last Byzantine emperor, to Catherine the Great’s Greek Plan in the 1780s, which aimed to partition the Ottoman Empire and restore a Byzantine state under Russian influence, Russia repeatedly sought control of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits. These efforts, including near-misses in the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1828–29 and 1877–78, were thwarted by European powers like Britain and France, who feared Russian dominance over the Black Sea and Mediterranean trade routes. Odesa, founded by Catherine II in 1794 as a naval and trade hub, was part of this southward expansion, but its role was subordinate to the ultimate prize of Constantinople. Today, while some Russian ultranationalists, like Semyon Bagdasarov, invoke Constantinople as a symbol of imperial revival, no credible military plan connects Odesa’s capture to a literal reconquest of Istanbul.

The notion of Russia taking Odesa en route to Constantinople faces insurmountable obstacles in 2025. Russia’s military is stretched thin, with reports of 100,000 troops massing for a possible summer offensive but no clear path to victory in Ukraine, let alone beyond. Turkey, a NATO member controlling Istanbul, maintains a strong military and complex relations with Russia, making any move on Constantinople a geopolitical fantasy. Moreover, historical Russian plans for Constantinople, like the 1915 Constantinople Agreement, collapsed due to internal turmoil (e.g., the Bolshevik Revolution) or external opposition, a pattern that echoes today’s constraints. Ukrainian resistance in Odesa, bolstered by civil society and drone warfare, further complicates Russian designs. While Putin may dream of imperial grandeur, practical realities—military overreach, economic strain, and international opposition—render the idea of reconquering Constantinople via Odesa a distant, if not delusional, aspiration.