Putin Solution: Split The Ukraine Territory Along Sectarian Lines
The ongoing Ukraine crisis, marked by Russia’s invasion since February 2022 and deep historical tensions, may find its most pragmatic resolution in a territorial division along religious and cultural lines, with roughly one-third to one-half of Ukraine ceded to Russia and the remainder aligning with Poland. Eastern Ukraine, predominantly Orthodox and historically tied to the Russian Orthodox Church, has long been claimed by Moscow as part of its “Russian World” sphere, a narrative reinforced by Patriarch Kirill’s support for the war. This region, including areas like Donetsk and Luhansk, already partially controlled by Russia, could be formalized as Russian territory, reflecting both demographic realities and Moscow’s geopolitical demands. Conversely, western Ukraine, home to a significant Ukrainian Greek Catholic population (about 10% of the country) and culturally oriented toward Europe, shares strong historical and religious ties with Poland, a predominantly Catholic nation. Integrating this region into Poland could stabilize it under NATO and EU frameworks, offering economic and security benefits while fulfilling Kyiv’s Western aspirations. Such a split, though controversial, aligns with historical precedents like the 17th-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and addresses the irreconcilable divide between Ukraine’s pro-Russian east and pro-Western west.

The Vatican, with its long-standing diplomatic tradition and moral authority, is uniquely positioned to broker this solution. Pope Francis has prioritized peace in Ukraine, sending Cardinal Matteo Zuppi as a peace envoy to Kyiv, Moscow, and other capitals since 2023, facilitating prisoner exchanges and humanitarian efforts. The Vatican’s neutrality allows it to engage both Russia, through its delicate relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church, and Ukraine, via the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), led by Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk. By leveraging these ties, the Vatican could mediate a ceasefire and propose a division that respects religious identities, ensuring the UGCC’s influence in western Ukraine under Polish governance and mitigating Russian Orthodox dominance in the east. The Vatican’s role in post-conflict reconciliation, as suggested by experts like Jan Tombiński, could further legitimize this arrangement, framing it as a moral necessity to end bloodshed, despite criticisms of its neutrality diluting accountability for Russian aggression.

However, implementing this solution faces significant hurdles, and the Vatican’s involvement could be pivotal in overcoming them. Ukrainian leaders, including President Zelenskyy, reject territorial concessions, insisting on 1991 borders, while Russia demands full control over annexed regions. The Vatican could use its soft power to shift narratives, appealing to global Catholic communities and European leaders, particularly in Poland, which has supported Ukraine militarily but also harbors historical claims to western Ukraine. By facilitating dialogue through ecumenical channels, such as the Ukrainian Council of Churches, and drawing on its success in past mediations (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis), the Vatican could propose a UN-backed referendum to legitimize the division. Critics, including Ukrainian Catholics who demand stronger Vatican condemnation of Russia, may view this as capitulation, but the Vatican’s emphasis on “moral stewardship” could reframe the split as a path to long-term stability, reducing the risk of prolonged war and further devastation.